

M^cCallister A. J. DCI - +
[Nov 1961 - Apr 1965] Robinson

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Senate For Rel Comm; the Jt Comm on Atomic E; and the Preparedness Investigating Subcomm. all have resps regarding the nuclear test ban treaty.

W/in the Preparedness Investigating Subcomm, a Special Subcomm on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Safeguards has been created to ~~xxxxxxx~~ insure there are adqquate detections systems to detect Sov explosions. Sen. Henry Jackson chairs this subcomm, as well as the Subcomm on ~~MMMM~~ Military Applications of the Jt Comm on Atomic E. Jackson very active in considration of the issues involved in test ban treaty and relies heavily on CIA for info.

"An all-source briefing" of these 2 subcomms given Aug 1965

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"Consistent w/ past practice, the Agency will continue to meet periodically w/ the four CIA Subcomms, on a weekly basis if possible."

From bery beginning of his tenure as DCI, Raborn announced his intention to maintain close contact w/ the 4 subcomms., promising to do so at his confirmation hearings. At these hearings he said "I believe that the interests of this country are served by a continuing program of the Central Intell. A. keeping the members informed, not only of intell. information but also as to the activities, programs and organization of the CIA itself."

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the chairman of the 4 parent comms are also the chairmen of the 4 CIA subcomms. membership on the subcomms generally determined on basis of seniority on the full comms.

until his recent retirement, Harry Byrd served on Sen ArmSer Subcomm--Stuart Symington took his place and has ~~BBBBBB~~ "already demonstrated that he will be an active and enthusiastic member."

Saltonstall has announced his retirement at end of 1966 and his places on both Sen. subcomms. will need to be filled.

provided for CIA Retirement and Disability System
the result of enactment of H.R. 8427, 88th Cong.
text of act appears at 78 Statutes-at-Large 1043 et seq.

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and Walter Pforzheimer
Interview / Lawrence Houston, Nov. 17, 1982, no transcript

both Houston and Pforzheimer are very skeptical re Hank Plaster's theseis that McCone was unpopular on the Hill.
"Absolutely untrue," Pforz. ~~xxx~~ said.

instead, McCone was canned becuz he was a member of the JFK circle and therefore made LBJ uncomfotable.

Interview w/ Lawrence Houston, Nov. 17, 1982, no transcript

McCone "would comment on policy when asked."
When he say on Excomm during Cuban missile crisis, he felt
free to comment on policy, becuz he was there not as DCI but
as a member of Excomm.

the Q of whether the Senate would approve the nuclear test ban treaty very much up in the air. McCone and Houston went before the Senate Preparedness Comm (Subcomm?) for the DCI to testify. Houston believes that McCone's testimony was so effective that the DCI can be rightly credited w/ ultimately swaying the Senate to approve the treaty

UNCLASSIFIED

the story was carried on the back pages of NYT and caused
little stir [redacted] and subsequent
days]

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some evidence of cong. unrest surfaced during confirmation proceedings for McCone.

Eugene McCarthy unhappy w/ answers McCone had given the Senate Armed Serv Comm, esp. McCone's apparent disinclination to alter the existing cong. oversight process.

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SNIE 85-3-62, on Cuba. "The Military Buildup in Cuba" judged on balance that Rus not deploying offensive missiles in Cuba.

estimate approved by USIB on Sept 19. Subsequent study determined that the 1st shipment of missiles has arrived on Sept 8 and that a 2nd shipment reached Cuba on the 15th.

McCone, on his honeymoon, cabled on the 20th that the SNIE should be recalled and rewritten becuz BNE had not considerex the increased Sov bargaining power deployment of IRBMs would give the Soviets.

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the revealing photos from U-2 not printed + seen until Oct. 15

Cong mad a study of the intell ramifications of the crisis, and showed an active interest in the episode during hearings of the fiscal 1964 mil. budget.

the cong. inquiry focused on whether a "photography gap" had contributed to the crisis, struck by the fact that the San Cristobal area had not been covered from Aug. 29 until Oct. 14.

the main charges vs. intell. lodged by the Preparedness Investigating Subcomm of the Senate ArvSer Comm. Their report conceded that US intell. had done "a reasonably competent job" in acquiring intell info but condemned the analysts who, in their opinion, had permitted the intuition that Sov policy would not introduce strategic weapons into Cuba to warp their judgment and shape their assessments.

****see US Cong (88/1), Senate Armed Serv, Interim REport:
The Cuban Military Buildup, 1963.

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Nov 10, 1982

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McCone by end of his term as DCI had alienated many on Capitol Hill because of his refusal to change CIA estimates re the level of the Sov. threat. Hardliners on the Hill wanted him to be more alarmist, but McCone refused to alter the intelligence given him by his analysts. Raborn was chosen as DCI solely becuz he had a good reputation on the Hill. Raborn had been head of the Polaris program (though his staff had done all the work--Raborn had not been resp. for its success), and it was thought he would get along w/ Cong. well.
